Pending the resolution of the constitutional challenge to Article 467 (2) of the Civil Procedure Code in Case No. 183D/2021 before the Constitutional Court of Romania (the first case in which these legal provisions are subject to constitutional review), raised in a dispute managed by SCPA Șomlea & Asociații, the manner in which this legal text should be interpreted in judicial practice remains under discussion. Of particular interest is a recent judgment delivered by the Cluj Court of Appeal in the very dispute that triggered the referral to the Constitutional Court.
Article 467 (2) of the Civil Procedure Code provides that:“The party that has partially enforced the first-instance judgment, although it was not subject to provisional enforcement, shall no longer have the right to file an appeal with regard to the enforced provisions.”
These provisions had no equivalent in the former Civil Procedure Code, and the Explanatory Memorandum to Law No. 134/2010 (enacting the new Civil Procedure Code) provides no justification for depriving the party that enforces a non-enforceable first-instance judgment of the right to appeal. This matter (among others) is precisely what is currently under constitutional review.
Civil procedural doctrine establishes a link between Article 467 (2) and partial tacit acquiescence to the judgment — an act of disposition regulated by Article 464 (3). The latter provision states unequivocally: “Tacit acquiescence may be inferred only from precise and concordant acts or facts which clearly express the party’s intention to adhere to the judgment.”
It has been noted that “Article 467 (2) regulates the effects on appeal of partial tacit acquiescence to the judgment, in cases where the judgment was not subject to provisional enforcement by operation of law (Article 448) or for which provisional enforcement was not authorized.”[1] The doctrine emphasizes:“(…) neither refraining from opposing enforcement, nor compliance with enforcement carried out by judicial bailiffs as a sign of respect and submission to the authority of the law, nor enforcement under the threat of penalties, nor the lapse of the time limit for appeal — which entails forfeiture — shall constitute tacit acquiescence.”[2]
Consequently, “Voluntary enforcement of the judgment, signifying the party’s unequivocal will to adopt it as its own, must not be accompanied by reservations. This is the only form of implicit acquiescence.”[3]
It follows that:“The enforcement of a judgment by the losing party does not, in itself and without distinction, entail acquiescence to that judgment. It has such an effect only where it admits of no other reasonable interpretation.”[4]
However, in judicial practice, the provisions of Article 467 paragraph (2) have, until recently, been interpreted rather rigidly, courts holding that:
“The subjective motives invoked by the appellant for making payment of the amount of (…) ordered against it by Civil Judgment No. xxxx/03.11.2014 — namely, to avoid the continued accrual of delay penalties — are irrelevant in the present context, since the provisions of Article 467 paragraph (2) of the Civil Procedure Code are explicit in the sense that a party which voluntarily and partially enforced a non-provisionally enforceable first-instance judgment loses the right to appeal the enforced provisions.”(Civil Decision No. 373/27.04.2015 of the Cluj Specialized Tribunal)
In the same vein, almost all judgments invoking Article 467 paragraph (2) have been rendered, save for a single identified exception — a decision that stressed the volitional element of tacit acquiescence through enforcement of a non-enforceable first-instance judgment. There, the court held that the conduct of the party who fully paid the debt established by the appealed judgment constituted tacit and complete acquiescence to the judgment, as such enforcement had not been accompanied by any objections or reservations. (Civil Decision No. 666/09.12.2019 of the Cluj Court of Appeal)
In the case forming the subject matter of this analysis, the defendants were ordered by the first-instance judgment to pay a real estate brokerage commission, compensatory damages, and penalty payments amounting to EUR 30 per day of delay. Since the penalties were not set as a percentage of the commission but as a fixed amount, and were not contractually capped at the value of the commission (despite an express clause), by the time the first-instance judgment was served, they had already accumulated to nearly three times the commission.
After lodging the appeal, the defendants paid the commission to the claimant solely to stop the accrual of penalties, expressly stating the purpose of the payment and their disagreement with the appealed judgment in a written communication accompanying the proof of payment.
The Court of Appeal, rejecting the objection of partial inadmissibility of the appeal, held that:“Having regard to the legal definition of tacit acquiescence to a judgment, it is evident that we are not in the presence of such acquiescence, since there is no certain intention of the party to adhere to the judgment, quite the contrary. From letter no. (…) issued by the appellants–defendants and communicated to the respondent, it clearly emerges both the firm position of the appellants contesting the legality and soundness of the first-instance judgment, and the purpose of complying with the appealed provision — namely, strictly to limit their losses in the event that the solution is upheld on appeal, by stopping the accrual of delay penalties of EUR 30 per day, owed under the appealed judgment as of the due date of the brokerage commission (inclusive) and until actual payment under the brokerage contract.”
On appeal on points of law, the solution rejecting the exception of partial inadmissibility was upheld, the court reasoning that: “The enforcement of a judicial act for the purpose of mitigating damage, while simultaneously making use of all procedural means aimed at its reformation in accordance with the procedural law governing the dispute, does not amount to acquiescence within the meaning of Article 454 of the Civil Procedure Code. The factual circumstances accompanying the enforcement, as retained by the appellate court, cannot be construed as the party’s intention to adhere to the judgment enforced.” (Civil Decision No. 199/07.04.2022 of the Cluj Court of Appeal)
Without purporting to provide a formula for success regarding the admissibility of appeals in cases involving enforcement of non-provisionally enforceable first-instance judgments, the present article seeks to contribute to a new interpretative approach of Article 467 paragraph (2) of the Civil Procedure Code – one that may, hopefully, be embraced by the courts of law as well.
[1] G. Boroi & Co., The New Civil Procedure Code. Article-by-Article Commentary, Vol. I, Articles 1–526, Hamangiu Publishing House, Bucharest, 2013, p. 871.
[2] V.M. Ciobanu & Co., The New Civil Procedure Code: Commented and Annotated, Vol. I – Articles 1–526, Universul Juridic Publishing House, Bucharest, 2016, p. 1285.
[3] Deleanu, Treatise on Civil Procedure. The New Civil Procedure Code, Vol. II, Universul Juridic Publishing House, Bucharest, 2013, p. 188.
[4] C.Gr.C. Zotta, Annotated Civil Procedure Code, 2nd edition, Vol. IV, “Tirajul”, Institute of Graphic Arts, Bucharest, 1941, pp. 250–252, No. 25.
